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Soaring agricultural prices in 2007/2008, followed by decreasing prices in 
2009/2010 then a new surge in late 2010/ 2011, have placed the mana-
gement of agricultural price volatility at the heart of policy debates. Many 
developing countries have implemented policies to limit agricultural price 
volatility and its adverse effects, without always achieving the expected 
results.
Analysis of recent experiences in Africa shows that in order to be effective, 
a policy measure must meet four conditions: it must be based on robust 
knowledge; it must be predictable; its funding must be secured; and its 
enforcement must be monitored.
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Protecting 
the domestic market
For several years, often in response to the 
2007/2008 crisis, many developing countries 
have been stepping up their intervention to 
stabilise agricultural prices on their domes-
tic markets. The policies implemented are 
particularly aimed at protecting domestic 
markets from price fluctuations on the 
international market, by combining border 
measures with domestic market measures. 
They reflect both the will to restore the role 
of the State in the regulation of agrifood 
markets and a loss of faith in the functio-
ning of international trade.
These policies diverge from the recommen-
dations of international donors. Donors 
argue that trade liberalisation stabilises 
prices, as a price shock on a national market 
is absorbed by a globalised market through 
dilution or compensation effects. To avoid 
the adverse effects of price hikes or slumps, 
they advocate, in the short term, private risk 
management mechanisms and safety nets 
and, in the medium and long term, pro-
grammes to increase agricultural producti-
vity.
A broad range of policy measures are avai-
lable to countries. Border measures are 
aimed at adjusting supply to demand in the 
territory, by controlling imports and exports: 
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tariffs, import and export licences; state 
imports; or export restrictions. Domestic 
market measures are aimed more at adjus-
ting supply to demand over time, especially 
through the management of buffer stocks, 
which may be combined with subsidies or 
taxes on the price of products or agricultu-
ral inputs.
To limit agricultural price volatility on their 
markets, African countries have combined 
border measures with domestic market 
measures. But how effective has this been? 
Despite the lack of hindsight, several les-
sons emerge from recent experiences.
Five African countries were studied: Mada-
gascar and Mali for rice, and Kenya, Malawi 
and Zambia for maize. These five countries 
share certain characteristics. Their revenue 
is low: gross domestic product per capita is 
less than 1 000 US dollars. Their cereal 
consumption is high: cereals account for 
over half of total calorie intake (from 50% 
in Kenya to 66% in Mali). Finally, these 
countries import less than a quarter of their 
cereal consumption (from 10% in Malawi 
to 25% in Kenya).
For each country, price volatility manage-
ment policies have been described and clas-
sified by periods according to the measures 
undertaken. The periods laid out reveal a 
tradition of intervention in agricultural 
markets that has persisted in East African 
countries, including during the period of 
liberalisation. However, price instability 
management policies were abandoned in 
Mali and Madagascar, before being restored 
recently. Country by country and period by 
period, local price series have been exami-
ned. The coefficients of variation (the ratio 
of the standard deviation to the mean) have 
been calculated and compared to those on 
international markets. State intervention is 
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exacerbate the crisis
considered effective if the coefficient of 
variation for agricultural prices on the 
domestic market is lower than the coeffi-
cient on the international market.
Three situations can be distinguished:
- State intervention has limited cereal price 
volatility, for example in Madagascar and 
Zambia during the management of the 
2007/2008 crisis;
- State intervention only partially succeeded 
in limiting price volatility, for example in 
Mali during the 2005 and 2008 crises;
- State intervention increased price volati-
lity, for example in Madagascar in 2004, in 
Zambia in 2001, 2002 and 2005, in Malawi 
in 2005, and in Kenya in 2008.
What were the factors of success or failure? 
Beyond the measure chosen, the conditions 
for implementing this measure appear to be 
decisive.
Choosing measures 
according to national 
specificities 
In order to be effective, each type of measure 
must meet four conditions, with varying 
degrees of importance depending on the 
measure: the intervention must be based on 
robust knowledge; it must be predictable; its 
funding must be secured; and its enforce-
ment must be monitored.
Robust knowledge
Whatever the measure, in-depth knowledge 
of the situation and of the mechanisms at 
work is required. In practice, access to robust 
expertise is a decisive condition for the effec-
tiveness of State intervention. Technical 
expertise underpins decisions and guides 
choices. What stock volumes should be built 
up? At what moment in time? At what 
price? At what price should stocks be sold 
off? What volumes should be imported or 
exported? At what level should tariffs be set?
Accurate analyses based on sound data are 
needed to anticipate requirements, for 
example through early warning systems. In 
Zambia in 2001, food requirements were 
underestimated, which delayed the govern-
ment’s reaction and that of private impor-
ters; however, in 2005 they were correctly 
anticipated thanks to informal exchanges of 
information between representatives of far-
Countries combine several measures to stabilise prices
Mali
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mers and of the government. Expertise may 
be collective, as in Madagascar within the 
consultation platform set up in 2008 (see 
next section).
Predictable intervention
State intervention should be announced so 
that private operators can anticipate it and 
make informed strategy decisions.
This is a key condition whatever the measure 
considered. For import control, private 
importers must be able to predict the 
volumes imported by the State, the date of 
importation and the tariff level. For internal 
market measures, merchants must be able to 
anticipate the volumes that will be sold off, 
the date of sale and the selling price. In the 
absence of this information, private opera-
tors will tend to withdraw from the market: 
this is known as the crowding out effect, and 
may increase price volatility. For example, in 
Zambia in 2005 and in Kenya in 2008, some 
merchants, seeing domestic prices rise, asked 
the State to waive import tariffs. The State 
announced an agreement in principle, wit-
hout specifying the date of implementation. 
In expectation of the tariff waiver, the ope-
rators delayed their imports, which accen-
tuated price hikes. As another example, in 
Zambia in 2001 and 2002, in Madagascar 
in 2004 and in Malawi in 2005, the State 
decided to import cereals to offset the defi-
cit caused by insufficient national produc-
tion, without specifying the date or the 
volumes of such imports. Fearing State com-
petition (especially given that State imports 
may be subject to lower tariffs), the private 
operators decided not to import. The volume 
of State imports was too low and the date of 
importation too late to limit the price hikes 
on domestic markets.
Conversely, predictable intervention may 
ensure effectiveness. In Madagascar during 
the 2008 crisis, the State decided to use 
imports to meet national rice consumption 
and to restrict soaring agricultural prices. It 
set up a consultation platform to anticipate 
requirements for rice. Private operators and 
public agents shared information and were 
able to implement appropriate strategies.
Secured funding
The State must be in a position to free up 
funds to finance the costs linked to State 
intervention. Financial capacity is essential 
to costly measures. For example, in Mali in 
2005 and 2008, the budget allocated to the 
operation of buffer stocks was not enough 
to provide these stocks with their own wor-
king capital and to therefore build up suffi-
cient volumes to curb soaring cereal prices.
On the contrary, in Zambia and Kenya, 
substantial financial resources were allocated 
to the operation of buffer stocks and to 
maize price subsidies. In Zambia, the public 
budget allocated to internal market measures 
represented 4% of the total national budget 
in 2007; this considerable budget was partly 
financed by mining revenue.
Furthermore, it is important to plan how to 
limit the additional costs that may arise, 
especially those linked to production incen-
tives, such as producer price subsidies. In 
Malawi, for example, producer price and 
agricultural input subsidies proved particu-
larly costly, calling into question the price 
instability management policy. A quota 
system would limit the existence of additio-
nal costs.
Monitored enforcement
The State must be able to guarantee that its 
intervention has been effectively imple-
mented and carried through. This monito-
ring capacity is essential for border measures 
(imports and exports). In Mali in 2005, 
national production was low, leading the 
government to ban cereal exports. This mea-
sure proved ineffective due to difficulties 
monitoring borders – a condition that is 
even harder to meet given that the country 
has extensive land borders, as do many of the 
Sahel countries. Monitoring capacities are 
also necessary for intervention on domestic 
markets, especially for cereal consumption 
subsidies and the administration of producer 
prices. For example, in Zambia in 2001, the 
subsidies paid to merchants were not passed 
on to consumer prices; they therefore failed 
to limit price increases.
Measures may be circumvented by public 
agents (stabilisation agencies not applying 
floor prices) or by private operators (mer-
chants not passing on prices or choosing to 
export in an illegal manner).
In any case, this behaviour is motivated by 
the pursuit of private income, and it under-
mines the effectiveness of the stabilisation 
policy. To ensure the policy it has defined is 
effective, the State must therefore be able to 
both monitor its enforcement and to pena-
lise non-compliant behaviours.
Alone, 
the State will be 
unable to stabilise 
agricultural prices on 
domestic markets. 
Cooperation with 
private actor 
 is essential.
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Associating public 
and private 
stakeholders 
Beyond seeking miracle remedies, govern-
ments must ensure that the measures adop-
ted will be effective in the context of their 
countries, failing which they may exacerbate 
the crisis. They must therefore choose mea-
sures according to their institutional, geogra-
phical, social, political and economic 
environment. For example, a low-income 
country with no specific resources, or one 
that is dependent on donors for its current 
expenditures, will need to guarantee its 
financial capacity before building up public 
buffer stocks. A landlocked country with 
extensive land borders should not ban 
exports to halt soaring prices, but instead 
should favour regional policies to offset the 
porosity of its borders. On the other hand, 
an island country may choose to control its 
borders, as Madagascar did to good effect.
The four conditions identified concern the 
capacity of States to define and enforce 
policies, and to ensure operators have faith 
in State intervention and will comply with 
it. Some developing countries may struggle 
to meet these conditions because of their 
institutional fragility.
Although the State has a key role to play, 
alone it will be unable to stabilise agricultu-
ral prices on domestic markets. Cooperation 
between public and private actors is vital to 
the success of price volatility management 
policies. Consultation platforms have 
demonstrated their effectiveness in Mada-
gascar. Public-private partnerships may also 
be envisaged to manage stocks: consultation 
on the methods for stockholding, joint fun-
ding, or contractual arrangements between 
the State and private actors concerning sto-
rage. This cooperation between public and 
private operators is still in its infancy in 
developing countries, and requires further 
research. In particular, the apparent contra-
diction between the need for transparency 
regarding stock volumes to anticipate food 
crises and the pursuit of private interests 
must be analysed.n
This issue of Perspective takes up certain ele-
ments for reflection developed within the 
Groupe de recherches sur la régulation des 
marchés agricoles (GREMA - research group 
on agricultural market regulation), which brings 
together experts from the French Society of 
Agriculture, CIRAD, GRET and IRAM. It is 
based on a study coordinated by Françoise 
Gérard, which includes case studies in Africa 
conducted by Arlène Alpha, Sophie Barthelon, 
Hélène David-Benz, Franck Galtier, Françoise 
Gérard and Élodie Maître d’Hôtel. 
The study is available on line: 
http://www.inter-reseaux.org/IMG/pdf/Mana-
ging_Food_Price_Volatility_for_Food_Secu-
rity_and_Development_Grema.pdf
- Gérard F., Alpha A., Beaujeu R., Levard L., 
Maître d’Hôtel É., Rouillé d’Orfeuil H., Bricas 
N., Daviron B., Galtier F., Boussard J.-M. 2011. 
Managing Food Price Volatility for Food Secu-
rity and Development, 163p. 
The elements presented in this issue of 
Perspective are taken up in the following 
document:
- Maître d’Hôtel É., Le Cotty T., 2011. Is a 
public regulation of food price volatility feasible 
in Africa? An ARCH approach in Kenya. Paper 
presented at the annual conference of the Inter-
national Society of New Institutional Econo-
mics, Stanford USA.
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